Luftwaffe
German Air Force of World War 2

Since this web page is concerned primarily with the Luftwaffe between 1939-1945, it is assumed that the visitor has a basic acquaintance with Luftwaffe history prior to World War 2: the banning of military aircraft production by Germany in the Versailles Treaty of 1919; the gradual growth of para-military activities from the mid-1920s; the clandestine factories and flying schools in Germany and Russia; the development of high-speed 'mailplanes' and 'sporting' single-seaters that later became bombers and fighters; the open secret of the existence of a German air force following Hitler's accession to power in 1933 and the creation of the Third Reich; the official declaration of the Luftwaffe's existence two years later, on 1 March 1935; and the blooding of many of its newer combat types in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939.

Picture: CinC Luftwaffe Hermann Goring, then with the rank of Generalfeldmarschall, congratulating men of I/StG77 at Radom, Poland, in September 1939, on the succesfull conclusion of the first pahse of the invasion of that country. Other Luftwaffe senior commanders in the foreground are: second from left after Goring, Generalmajor Wolfram von Richthofen, commander of the Fliegerkorps of which the Stuka unit was part from, fourth from left, Generaloberst Erhard Milch, Inspector General; and fifth from the left, Generalleutnant Hans Jeschonnek, Chief of Staff.

Thus prepared, in September 1939 the Luftwaffe entered World War 2 with a front-line aircraft strength of nearly 4,200 aircraft. Most of these, with the principal exception of these in reconnaissance units, were formed into Geschwader, a Geschwader being the approximate equivalent of an RAF Group. The Geschwader were divided into Gruppen (each Gruppe approximating to an RAF Wing), normally three in number; and each Gruppe was in turn sub-divided into three Staffeln (Squadrons), with a usual complement of 9-12 aircraft per Staffel. Reconnaissance units were normally organised into Gruppen and Staffeln only.

With such resources, it was hardly surprising that the early months of the offensive should result in resounding successes for the German air and ground forces, which swept through Poland in less than a month, conquered Norway - with the first airborne invasion in military history - in two months, and had occupied France and the Low Countries before the end of June 1940. To Hitler and Goring, the Blitzkrieg (lightning war) doctrine had been fully vindicated. They saw no need to expand the Luftwaffe, or even to improve its existing equipment, in order to defeat Britain, and priority for aircraft production was substantially reduced. This was the first mistake, and it brought about the Luftwaffe's first serious failure.

So far, the air force had been used as a tactical weapon, creating air supremacy and providing support for the ground forces of the Wehrmacht; and it had, in the main, met little in the way of modern fighter opposition. In the summer and autumn of 1940, however, its lightly-armed bombers seen proved ill-defended against the RAF fighters, and their escorts lacked either the agility (in the case of the twin-engined Bf110) or the range (in the case of the Bf109) to wrest from the RAF's single-engined Hurricanes and Spitfires the air supremacy necessary for the bombers to operate unmolested. In October 1940 it was forced to switch to the night bombing of British cities - the 'Blitz' - which lasted until the spring of 1941.

Picture: German bomber crew of KG26 Lowen (Lions) before the Coventry raid, together with umbrellas with propagnda slogans, which they were thrown out of their He111 aircraft over Britain.

Meanwhile, Hitler's pursual of his 'continental policy' in Europe and the Mediterranean resulted in the conquest of the Balkan nations and the successful invasion of Crete. Here, again because it was able to provide conditions of air supremacy against comparatively inferior opposition, the Luftwaffe's employment as a tactical air arm paid greater dividends. It was unable to reproduce that success against Malta, but was drafted in increasing numbers to North Africa following the British offensive which began in late 1941, and established a substantial strength in northern Italy, for future operations, following that country's entry into the war on 10 June 1940.

While all these operations were going on, the Luftwaffe was also playing a substantial part in the general anti-shipping war and particularly in the so-called 'Battle of the Atlantic'. Its maritime aircraft went mine-laying in the Channel and down the eastern seaboard of the British Isles; harassed and sank Allied shipping in British coastal waters, as a prelude to the proposed invasion of Britain; and partnered the U-boat submarine force in its attempts to cut off supplies to Britain from across the Atlantic and elsewhere. This anti-shipping campaign was sustained in force from the outbreak of war and was not noticeably relaxed until late 1942.

With the Luftwaffe already dispersed on several fronts, the last thing it wanted or needed - and the same was true for the other German armed services - was to be committed even further by Hitler's irrational decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941. Fighting on the Eastern Front made heavy demands upon Luftwaffe strength, in both men and machines, and the extensive losses suffered left it in a seriously weakened condition by the end of 1942. Nor was Russia its only problem. Already, at home, it had had to take steps to counter the nocturnal bombing of Germany in strength by the RAF, which had begun over Cologne on the night of 30-31 May 1942 with Operation Millennium, the first 'thousand-bomber' raid. For the first time, it had had to create a night fighter force, for the bombers were becoming too numerous for comfort.

By now, airborne radar had entered the picture, both as an Allied bombing aid and as a means of helping the German night fighters to locate the enemy bombers. Daylight reprisal raids against England by fighter-bombers, and attacks by night fighter/intruders, failed materially to mitigate the Allied air offensive.

Picture: Luftwaffe fighter pilots were waiting in front of their Bf109's for the next interception mission.

By the end of 1942 the Luftwaffe had to face the facts that its strategies had been wrong; that its future policy was, to say the least, indecisive; and that it was going to have to prepare to fight a much longer war than at first anticipated. Aircraft production was stepped up, and fresh looks were taken at designs to replace or improve upon the aircraft already in service. The situation worsened in 1943 with the addition of USAAF day bombers to the attack on Germany, to provide a round-the-clock bombing offensive with the RAF, and with the failure of the Luftwaffe in Russia. This decline in the Luftwaffe's fortunes came to a head on 18 August 1943, following a particularly devastating attack by the RAF on the rocket testing centre at Peenemunde, when Generaloberst Hans Jeschonnek, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, committed suicide.

Jeschonnek's successor, General Günther Korten, started with the right idea. He reorganised the Luftwaffe giving priority to strategic bombing, especially of Russia, and to home defence, reducing the use of air power in support of the Army to a minimum. Unfortunately for Korten's plans, the Russian counter-offensive between the summer of 1943 and the spring of 1944 largely negated the strategie bombing of Russian targets. Meanwhile, the Axis powers had been driven out of North Africa and the Allies were advancing steadily upward through Italy.

Nevertheless, during the first half of 1944 Korten had same cause for optimism. His first-line aircraft strength was now in excess of 5,500; the fuel situation (which had been something of a problem) was beginning to show signs of improvement; and so was the supply of better-trained aircrew from the flying schools. Several long-awaited newer types of aircraft were starting to enter service, such as the He177 and Ju188 bombers, the Me410 Zerstorer (destroyer, heavy fighter) and the He219 night fighter; much was expected of the new generation of jet fighters then under development; and the night fighter force was beginning to be effective against the Allied bombers.

Two main factors were to conspire against his optimism. First, since the early summer of 1943 the Allied bombing offensive bad been concentrated more and more against the centres of German aircraft and aero-engine production; second, the appearance of American day fighters such as the long-range Mustang, which provided much-needed protection to the previously unescorted USAAF day bombers penetrating deep into the Reich territory.

Picture: Too late for the Luftwaffe and the Third Reich was this Heinkel He162 Salamander jet fighter of I.Gruppe, Jagdgeschwader 1, which was on the point of beginning operations with this type when the war ended.

It has been estimated that Allied raids between mid-1943 and the end of 1944 cost the Luftwaffe same 14,000 fighters and 4,000 other types in lost production. On the other hand, if these aircraft had been received, shortages of aircrew, fuel and munitions would have severely limited their effective use.
Added to this campaign were specific Allied attacks on Romanian and other oilfields producing fuel for the German war effort.

Then, in the summer of 1944, came the D-day landings in France and the Russian advance into Poland, and from then on the decline gathered momentum. Panic measures, such as the V-weapons programme, the expansion of fighter production to the virtual exclusion of bombers and other types, the advent of jet- and rocket-powered interceptors, all came too late to stern the tide. The night fighter force declined in effectiveness; the concerted attack on Allied airfields in Europe at the beginning of 1945 - Operation Bodenplatte - failed; and, eventually, the fuel ran out.

In August 1939, on the eve of war, Goring's Order of the Day to the Luftwaffe had spoken of an air force 'inspired by faith in our Fuhrer and Commander-in-Chief.. . ready to carry out every command of the Fuhrer with lightning speed and undreamed of might'. The reality, the epitaph for an air force that was failed by its masters, was written after the war by General Karl Koller, who succeeded to the position of Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff after the death of General Korten:
'There are many reasons why Germany lost the war; political, economic and military reasons which were our own fault. None of these reasons were decisive in themselves, nor were they together decisive. Had they been avoided, a more favourable development of the situation might indeed have been possible. Quite apart from them, what was decisive in itself was the loss of air supremacy.
We remained voices crying in vain in the wilderness. Promises were made to build up the largest air force possible after the close of the Russian war. Millions of soldiers were then to be released from the Army and were to be sent to the aircraft industry and to the German Air Force. Only the Air Force was to be built up. In the meanwhile, however, the air armament was put way down on the list; first were submarines, then came tanks, then assault guns, then howitzers or Lord knows what, and then came the Air Force. Meanwhile, the Russian war was eating away men, material, armament and planes and the only thing that remained for the Air Force was a promise that was never kept. Its task was to make sacrifices.'