 Pilot Training of the Luftwaffe before 1942
The period of training given to new pilots of the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) was steadily shortened during the course of World War 2; the description below may be considered representative of the situation during the latter half of 1941.
For the prospective pilot joining the Luftwaffe from civilian life, the first step was a spell of six months at a Fliegerersatzabteilung or recruit training depot; this was the equivalent to the 'square-bashing' or 'boot camps' in other air forces. There the main emphasis was on drill and physical training, and the air aspect was introduced only in elementary lectures on the principles of wireless and map reading.
Picture: Formation of Focke-Wulf Fw44C primary tandem training biplanes, photographed at Bromberg in August 1940.
Having completed this initial training, the student pilot moved to a Fluganwarterkompanie, where he spent up to two months studying general aeronautical subjects. Thus prepared, he moved to an A/B Schule (elementary flying school) where he flew light aircraft such as the Klemm 35, the Focke Wulf 44 and the Buecker 131.
For his A2 licence the pupil received instruction in aerodynamics, aeronautical engineering, elementary navigation, meteorology, flying procedures and training in the reception of morse. For his B lince he flew higher-performance aircraft like the Arado 66, the Gotha 145 and the Arado 76, heavier aircraft like the Junkers W33 and W44 and the twin-engined Focke Wulf 58, and obsolescent combat types such as the He51, the Ar65 and the Hs123. On successful completion of his B2 training the candidate had between 100 and 150 hours flying time, and received his Luftwaffenflugzeugfuehrerschein (pilot's licence) and his Flugzeugfuehrerabzeichen (pilot's wings).
Those pilots selected for single-engined fighters or dive-bombers now went straight to the respective specialist schools for training in these roles.
Prospective twin-engined fighter, bomber and reconnaissance pilots went on to the C Flying Schools, where they received a further 50 to 60 hours flying during a course of some six months duration. These pilots were given ground training in advanced aeronautical subjects, and flew obsolescent operational types such as (in the case of bomber pilots) early versions of the He111, the Ju52, the Ju86 and the Do17. When he qualified at the C School the pilot received his ELF* or advanced pilot's licence. He was now able to fly his aircraft by day or by night with reasonable proficiency, had limited training in instrument flying, and could perform simple cross-country navigational flights under fair weather conditions.
On leaving the C School, the twin-engined fighter pilots went to their specialist school; the bomber and reconnaissance pilots were sent for 50 to 60 hours extra training in blind-flying, before moving to their specialist schools.
At the various specialist training establishments (Fighter, Bomber, Twin-engined Fighter, Dive-bomber and Reconnaissance) the pilots to fly multi-seat aircraft joined up
with their crews. Combined crew training began, flying in operational types of the latest design. In general the exercises engaged in at the specialist schools were similar to those flown by bomber and reconnaissance pilots at the C Schools, but the night and cross-country flights were of longer duration and were undertaken in less favourable weather. On completion of their training at the specialist school, the crew usually remained together and was sent to an operational unit.
An important point to note is that during the initial part of the war the role of the observer (German: Beobachter) in a multi-seat aircraft was not so close to that of navigator as the literal English translation of the term might suggest. In fact the observer was trained as an aircraft captain, having flown as a pilot up to C standard before moving to the observers' school for a nine-month course (where he received further training in blind flying as well as navigation). Soon after the outbreak of the war the rule of the observer being the aircraft captain was gradually relaxed; from the beginning of 1942 observer training steadily deteriorated, until by 1944 it was down to five months, with little pilot training.
Having passed through their respective specialist training schools, the crews were sent to Ergaenzungseinheiten (operational training units) attached to the various operational Geschwader or Gruppen (groups). Here the crews learnt the tactical methods peculiar to the operational units they were later to join. As well as providing operational training, the Ergaenzungseinheiten served as holding posts for trained crews until they were required by the front-line units.
From the time he joined the Luftwaffe until he arrived at his Ergaenzungseinheit, a fighter or dive-bomber pilot had received about 13 months training with 150 to 200 flying hours; a bomber or reconnaissance pilot had received respectively 20 months and 220 to 270 hours.
It must be stressed, however, that these figures refer only to men who had passed through the system prior to the beginning of 1942. For in that year the Luftwaffe training organisation, efficient and smooth-running at the beginning of the war, began to crack under the strain exerted upon it. |
 Decline of the Pilot Training
The Battle of Britain had been the first major setback for the Luftwaffe, but in the main the losses in trained crews were made good by drawing upon the reserves already available within the service. Moreover, the comparatively low casualty rate during the
first half of 1941 enabled the remaining gaps in the ranks to be filled without placing undue strain on the training organisation.
Picture: Arado 96 advanced trainers of the pilot training school near Paris, in February 1942.
The relentless rate of losses from the beginning of the Russian campaign, however, made demands which the flying training organisation found almost impossible to meet: during the first six months of the offensive Luftwaffe casualties in aircrew, of all categories from all causes in all theatres, amounted to some 2,200 men; during the second six months an almost exactly equal number of men was lost.
The campaign in Russia also brought more direct forms of pressure on the flying training organisation. Early in 1942 many Ju52 aircraft, together with their instructor pilots, were removed from the C, blind-flying and bomber schools and sent to Russia to supplement the fleet of air transports engaged in flying supplies to the German troops cut off at Demjansk and Cholm. Owing to actual losses and shortages at the front line units, many of the instructors and
aircraft were never returned to the training organisation. Later in the year the pace of air operations in the east led to a shortage of aviation fuel throughout the Luftwaffe; again it was the flying training schools that suffered.
The shortages of instructors, suitable aircraft and fuel threw out of gear the
training programme for bomber and reconnaissance crews; in the short term there was a surplus of partially-trained pilots from the A/B Schools, but at the same time a lack of trained crews available at the Ergaenzungseinheiten.
In July 1942 General Kuehl, the Director of Training, brought to Goering's notice the fact that the shortages were leading to an impossible situation at the C Schools. As was so often the case, the Reichsmarschall had a glib answer: he
ordered that the C Schools should be disbanded, and their functions taken over by the Ergaenzungseinheiten.
This proved to be
beyond the capacity of the latter, however, for they had insufficient aircraft or instructors to cope with this sudden influx of pupils; so, in their turn, the Ergaenzungseinheiten farmed out many of them to the operational Gruppen (groups) for training. The net result of this confused situation was that the general standard of training of new crews for the bomber and long-range reconnaissance units fell so low that operational efficiency began to suffer.
During 1943 the new Director of Training, Generalleutnant Kreipe, was able to slow the rate of deterioration of his organisation. But simple expedients, like the introduction of short glider courses to provide initial flying experience for pilots, could not make up for the perennial shortages of good instructors, modern aircraft and, above all, fuel.
By the beginning of 1944 German fighter pilots were joining their operational units with only about 160 hours flying training; this compared with more than double that figure for their counterparts in the RAF and the USAAF.
During the first half of 1944 the Luftwaffe day fighter units suffered debilitating losses at the hands of the better-trained American escort fighter pilots, whose P-51 Mustangs could in any case out-perform the best fighters the Germans then had in service at this time; during this period the home-defence units lost some 2,000 pilots killed, missing or wounded.
When the Luftwaffe training organisation tried to make good these heavy casualties with similar numbers of new pilots, the result was a vicious circle: the ill-trained replacement fighter pilots were no match for their opponents and suffered heavy losses, and their places in the front line were taken by new pilots who had had a more hurried training and were even less of a match for their opponents.
During the late spring standards fell yet further, when the B flying schools were disbanded. Fighter pilots were now sent into action with only about 112 hours flying, made up as follows: A School, two hours glider flying and 50 hours powered flying on elementary types; Fighter School, 40 hours; Replacement Fighter Groupe, 20 hours.
Moreover, the so-called Windhund programme, which provided for the hasty conversion of ex-bomber pilots by giving them 20 hours flying in fighters resulted in a stream of pilots little able to stand up to the enemy.
In September 1944 the Luftwaffe flying
training organisation received its death blow. With the systematic wrecking of the German synthetic fuel industry by Allied strategic bombers, aviation fuel production fell so far beneath Luftwaffe requirements that operations had to be curtailed. In such a climate the training schools, always the poor relation, could not survive long. First the elementary and many of the specialist schools were closed then, as the last of the trainees passed through, the specialist fighter schools were also disbanded and their instructors sent to the front. By February 1945 the Luftwaffe aircrew training organisation had, to all intents and purposes, ceased to exist. |
